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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARIE PENROD
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 940383-CA

DALE PENROD

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant.

The Defendant

submits

the

following

reply

brief

in

accordance with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court should award alimony only after considering
the financial condition and need of the receiving spouse, the
ability of the receiving spouse to provide for herself and the
ability of the payor spouse to provide support.

Any such

finding of the trial court should be based upon evidence adduced
in the case with sufficient clarity to allow the litigants and
this Court to review the same.

In this case, the trial court's

findings with regard to the amount of money earned by the
Plaintiff are erroneous and contradicted by the earning records
of the parties.

The trial court's findings with regard to the

Defendants's ability to pay are totally unsubstantiated by the
record.

The testimony and historical earnings of the parties

establishes that the income of the Plaintiff far exceeds that of
the Defendant.

Accordingly, the award of alimony in this case

should be set aside.
The trial court increased the alimony award based upon the

Plaintiff's voluntary contribution to an adult child on a church
mission.

The court did so without any finding of necessity or

special circumstance.

Because the trial court failed to make

findings pursuant to the child support statutes and because the
voluntary contribution has nothing to do with the Plaintiff
becoming a public charge or her standard of living, the findings
relating to the increased alimony and need of the Plaintiff
should be set aside.
The Findings of Fact requiring the Defendant to maintain a
life insurance policy in the face amount of $100,000.00 are
improper for two reasons.

First, counsel for the Plaintiff

failed to include the trial court's ruling that the face amount
of the policy was to reflect only the present value of the
Plaintiff's alimony award.

Secondly, inasmuch as the Plaintiff

was awarded alimony, this provision meant to insure the award,
should be stricken.
The court's finding with regard to the one-acre parcel was
erroneous.

The one-acre parcel was given to the Defendant by his

father as a gift.

The Plaintiff's name was added to the deed

only to facilitate financing.

Inasmuch as the Plaintiff did not

enhance the value of the lot and inasmuch as the identity of the
lot was lost through commingling or exchange, the value of the
lot should have been awarded to the Defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
A.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN AWARDING
ALIMONY TO THE PLAINTIFF

Standard of Appellate Review.
2

The Plaintiff has misstated the appellate standard of review
regarding alimony awards.
court

is

endowed

with

There is no question that the trial
considerable

discretion

in

awarding

alimony and that the award will not be over-turned unless there
has been a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.

Bingham v.

Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994); Paffell v. Paffell, 732
P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986).
However, in ruling on the adequacy of the trial

court's

findings, the test is as follows:
Where a trial court has considered these three factors
[(1) financial conditions and needs of the receiving
spouse; (2) ability of receiving spouse to provide
for herself; and, (3) the ability of the payor to
provide support] and has supported its rulings with
adequate findings based on sufficient evidence, we
will not disturb its determination unless it has
clearly abused its discretion. Willey v. Willey,
866 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah App. 1993); Chambers v.
Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992).
"Findings are adequate only if they are 'sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion
on each factual issue was reached.'" Hall v. Hall,
858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App.
1990)).

(Emphasis added).
3

See Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262 (Utah App. 1994).
There is no question that findings of fact that are without
adequately evidentiary foundation must be set aside.

Interior

Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, 247 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah App.
1994); Western Capital & Sacs., Inc. v. Kanudsvig, 768 P.2d 989,
991 (Utah App. 1989).
B.

Criteria for the Award of Alimony.

The parties agree that the general purpose of alimony is to
prevent the receiving spouse from becoming a public charge and to
maintain to the extent possible the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage.

Appellee's Brief at 6;

Schaumberg v.

Schaumberg, 240 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1994); Rosendahl v. Rosendahl,
240 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (1994); Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209,
1212 (Utah App. 1991).
In determining to award alimony and in setting the amount,
the trial court must consider (1) the financial conditions and
needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving
spouse to provide for him or herself; and (3) the ability of the
payor or spouse to provide support.

Chambers v. Chambers, 840

P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d
84 (Utah App. 1989).
C.

The Trial Court's Findings with Regard to the Financial
Conditions and Needs of the Plaintiff and Ability
of the Defendant to Pay Alimony are Inadequate.

The relevant sections of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Decree that relate to alimony are paragraphs 5 and 15
of the Findings which are mirrored
4

in paragraph

2 of the

Conclusions and paragraph 2 of the Decree.

Findings numbered 5

and 15 are as follows:
5.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff's monthly

income is $1,779.00 and imputes to the Defendant
monthly income in the sum of $2,383.00.

Defendant's

income is calculated based upon the testimony given at
trial by the Defendant which showed that he worked
twenty (20) hours per week, that sixty percent (60%) of
his employment was billed at the rate of $65.00/hour
and forty percent (40%) of his employment billed at the
rate of $40.00/hour, that he worked nine (9) months
during the year and that one-third (1/3) of his gross
income was attributable to expenses and therefore that
his yearly income amounted to $28,600.00 or $2,383.00
per month.

The Court further finds that Defendant

earns $7,732.00 more than Plaintiff each year.
15.

The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant

were married for over twenty-seven (27) years and that
Plaintiff is in need of alimony and that Defendant
should

pay

to

Plaintiff

as alimony

the

sum

$672.00/month said alimony to be permanent.

of

This

finding is based upon the additional expenses which
Plaintiff

presently

incurs

as reflected

on

her

Financial Declaration and which she anticipates will be
reduced after ten (10) months and upon the Defendant's
minimal expenses and his ability to pay.
5

There is no question that the court had a proper evidentiary
basis to determine that the Plaintiff's gross monthly income was
$1,731.00 and that her net monthly income was $1,230.00 (R. 61).
The figures outlined above came from the Plaintifffs financial
declaration introduced at trial (R. 61).

This Court should be

aware however that the Plaintiff on cross-examination conceded
that she had worked over the past ten years and had made
$19,851.29 ($1,654.27 per month) in 1986 which had grown by 1992
to $26,188.41 ($2,182.37 per month) (Defendant's Exhibit No. 12;
R. 103 at 47, 48).
There is no question that the Plaintiff testified that her
monthly expenses were $2,494.00 of which $350.00 per month was
spent on a voluntary contribution to her adult son that was on a
mission for his church (R. 58; 103 at 39-41).
Aside from the $350.00 voluntary contribution, the monthly
needs were established by her testimony.

The evidence therefor

showed that the Plaintiff had between $1,739.00 and $2,182.37 per
month in gross income.

The evidence establish that her monthly

needs were $2,994.00 minus the $350.00 voluntary contribution or
$2,144.00.
The major error committed by the trial court related to its
findings of the Defendant's ability to pay.

In her brief, the

Plaintiff simply recites pages out of the transcript and makes
generalizations (Appellee's Brief 11-13).
The parties both signed income tax returns from 1986 to 1992
which revealed the following income for the parties:
6

Year

Plaintiff

Defendant

1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987

$26,188.41
$23,650.10
$21,358.22
$22,854.73
$19,573.81
$19,071.95

$ 2,890.00
$ 7,231.00
$ 6,387.00
$14,562.00
$17,295.00
$13,724.00

1986

$19,851.29

$19,530.00

Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 12 and 13; R. 103 at 49-53, 74-79.
The Appellee does not dispute the record of earnings established
by the tax returns (Appellee's Brief at 7-13).
Most importantly, the Plaintiff continues to misconstrue the
record with regard to the Defendant's testimony of the amount of
time that he worked.

Finding of Fact No. 5, in which the trial

court attributes $2,283.00 to the Defendant is without any basis:
Defendant's

income

is

calculated

based

upon

the

testimony given at trial by the Defendant which showed
that he worked twenty (20) hours per week, that sixty
percent (60%) of his employment was billed at the rate
of $65.00/hour and

forty

percent

(40%)

of

his

employment billed at the rate of $40.00/hour, that he
worked nine (9) months during the year and that onethird (1/3) of his gross income

was

attributable

to

expenses and therefore that his yearly income amounted
to

$28,600.00

or

$2,383.00

per

month.

The

Court

further finds that Defendant earns $7,732.00 more than
Plaintiff each year.
R. 85.
The Defendant testified that to the time of trial, his net
7

income for five and a half months was $6,002.62 or $1,091.38 per
month (R. Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 12, 13 and 15; R. 103 at 4943, 74-79).
The

findings

of

the

trial

court

came

from

the

cross-

examination of the Defendant in which he testified:
A.

He had worked for five hours the day before the

trial (R. 103 at 94);
B.

That he billed $65.00 per hour for the cat and

tried to charge $35.00 to $40.00 per hour for the
truck (R. 103 at 100);
C.

When asked if he could estimate the percentage

of time he worked at $65.00 per hour versus $35.00
to $40.00 per hour, the Defendant testified that
he worked a little over half to two-thirds with the
cat and the other with the truck (R. 103 at 100-101);
D.

When asked to give an average of the number of

hours the Defendant worked a week, the Defendant
testified that he could not.

He stated that some

weeks he worked and some weeks he didn't (R. 103 at
102);
E.

Only when counsel for the Plaintiff asked the

Defendant the number of hours he worked the previous
week, was the Defendant able to answer that he
worked approximately 20 hours (R. 102 at 103).
It

is

apparently

from

that

testimony

that

the

court

extrapolated the ability of the Defendant to work 20 hours every
8

week of the year.

As clearly set forth in the transcript, the

Defendant testified that he had worked only 20 hours the week
before
There

the trial which occurred
is no

testimony

in the

in the month of July, 1993.
record

to establish

Defendant could work 20 hours every week of the year.

that

the

In fact

the Plaintiff herself testified that the Defendant's work was
confined to Spring and Summer (R. 103 at 9-10).
Accordingly, there is no evidence in the record to establish
any income on the part of the Defendant other than the average of
$1,091.38 for the five and a half months before the trial and the
amounts of income indicated on the tax returns.
The Appellee's brief also improperly uses the term "imputed
income."

(Appellee's Brief

at 7 ) .

impute income to the Defendant.

The trial court did not

The court was attempting to

determine the wages actually made by the Defendant.

The findings

of the trial court are completely inadequate to support a finding
of imputed income.
"Imputing

As this Court has explained:
income

to

an unemployed

or

underemployed

spouse when setting an alimony award is conceptually
appropriate
spouses's

as part

ability

of

to produce

Willey, 866 P.2d at 554.
impute

income

the

determination
a sufficient

of

that

income."

However, a court should not

for child or spousel support until it

first determines, "as a threshold matter, that income
should be imputed because the [spouse] is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed."

9

Hall, 858 P.2d at 1024.

Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1254 (Utah App. 1994).
The

findings of the trial

establish

court do not even attempt

that the Defendant was voluntarily

unemployed

and

therefore

the

findings

of

to

underemployed

or

income

be

must

supported by evidence.
In

summary,

the

evidence

does

not

support

the

court's

findings with regard to the ability of the Defendant to earn.
The

evidence

in the

case

established

that

historically

the

Defendant has made a small percentage of the income generated by
the

Plaintiff.

Inasmuch

as

the

findings

are

clearly

insupportable, they must be set aside.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FINDING THAT
VOLUNTARILY CONTRIBUTIONS TO AN ADULT CHILD
CONSTITUTED A LEGITIMATE LIVING EXPENSE OF
THE PLAINTIFF
The trial court ordered the Defendant to pay an increased
alimony award for ten months of $672.00 per month which then was
reduced to $322.00 per month which was to be permanent alimony.
The court made that award based upon the Plaintiff's voluntary
contribution of $350.00 to an adult child on a church mission (R.
103 at 146-148).
The Defendant contends that the court was compelling

the

Defendant to pay child support through the Plaintiff to an adult
child.

As outlined in the Appellant's original brief, the trial

court may order support of a child to age 21 but may do so only
upon

a

finding

circumstances."
Balls v.

of

"necessity"

and

"special

Utah Code Annotated 15-2-1

Hackele,

745 P.2d

836
10

or

unusual

(1953 as Amended);

(Utah App. 1987);

Jackman v.

Jackman, 696 P.2d 1191 (Utah 1985); Thornblad v. Thornblad, 849
P.2d 1197 (Utah App. 1994).
In response, the Plaintiff does not dispute that the $350.00
represents a voluntary contribution to an adult child an a
church mission (Appellee's Brief at 12). The Plaintiff contends
that because the Plaintiff had been incurring the expense prior
to the divorce, it was fairly considered

as part of the

Plaintiff's needs and expenses during the marriage (Appellee's
Brief at 12-13).
First, voluntary contributions to any third party can not be
considered as a need or expense of the receiving spouse.

As

acknowledged by both parties, the general purpose of alimony is
to prevent the receiving spouse from becoming a public charge and
to maintain to the extent possible the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage.
1212 (Utah App. 1991).

Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209,

The voluntary contribution to an adult

child has nothing to do with keeping the Plaintiff from becoming
a public charge and has no correlation to the Plaintiff's
standard of living.
The impropriety of the court's ruling is two-fold.

First,

the trial court was attempting to compel the Defendant to pay
child support for an adult child without making any finding of
necessity and using an award of alimony simply as a guise.
Secondly, the order is an unjustified personal affront to the
Defendant.

The court required the Defendant to pay by way of

alimony every dime that the parties had contributed to the
11

missionary son*

By increasing the alimony award $350.00, the

Defendant was responsible

for all of the contribution

to the

missionary which is totally unjustified based upon the relative
earning ability of the parties.

Additionally, the court order

usurped the right of the Defendant to provide voluntarily for his
adult son.
Because the order of the trial court is violative of the
rules

and

case

law regarding

child

support

and

because

the

voluntary contribution has nothing to do with becoming a public
charge or standard of living, the order of increased alimony for
ten months must be set aside.
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
REQUIRING THE DEFENDANT TO MAINTAIN A $100,000 LIFE
INSURANCE POLICY
The

trial

$100,000.00
Plaintiff

court

life

in order

ordered

insurance

the

policy

to protect

should the Defendant die.
MR. PETRO:

Defendant
for

the

to maintain
benefit

the Plaintiff's

of

alimony

the
the

award

In fact, the court stated:
So what's the holding then with

regard to life insurance?
THE COURT:

That up to the $100,000.00 amount be

maintained to protect Mrs. Penrod's interest in alimony
for the rest of her life, $322.00 a month.

If the

present value of that is less than $100,000.00, I'll
simply require him to maintain a sufficient amount to
make sure that should something happen to Mr. Penrod,
that she still receives the $322.00 a month.
12

R. 103 at 149.
As outlined in the original brief, the Defendant has two
objections.

First, inasmuch as the life insurance was meant to

protect the Plaintiff's alimony award, the ruling of this Court
with regard to the abatement of alimony should also abate any
requirement for life insurance.
Secondly, Judge Burningham explicitly ordered the amount of
insurance

required

only

to reflect

the value of the monthly

alimony award over Mrs. Penrod's expected life.
the

Findings of

Fact prepared by Plaintiff's counsel

omits Judge Burningham's
policy

Paragraph 16 of

ruling

that the

totally

face amount of the

only had to reflect the present value of the

alimony

award, which is obviously is significantly less than $100,000.00.
The response of the Plaintiff
raised

by

the

Defendant

totally misses the

(Appellee's

Brief

at

issues

13-15).

The

Plaintiff does not dispute that the life insurance order was to
insure the Plaintiff's alimony award and does not dispute that
Judge Burningham ordered that the face amount of the policy only
reflect the present value of the life insurance.
Accordingly, the order relating to life insurance, as with
the

alimony

award,

should

be

abated.

In

any

regard,

the

findings should be amended to reflect Judge Burningham's ruling
that the life insurance only represent the present value of the
alimony award.
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO COMPENSATE THE DEFENDANT FOR THE ONE-ACRE
PARCEL RECEIVED AS PART OF HIS INHERITANCE

13

There is very little dispute in the evidence relating to the
one-acre parcel on which the family home was built.

There is no

question that the one-acre parcel was deeded to the parties by
the Defendant's father, Leroy W. Penrod.

The transfer of the

deed was a gift inasmuch as the parties gave no consideration for
the land.
Likewise, there is no question that the conveyance of the
land was made to allow the parties to build a home.

Although the

Plaintiff testified that she thought the piece of property was
given to both the Plaintiff and Defendant, she did not have any
conversation

with

the

Defendant's

assumption could be made.

father

upon

which

that

The Defendant testified that the one-

acre parcel, as with the other land, was given to him by his
father.

The

Plaintiff's

Defendant

name

was

financing on the home.

testified

placed

on

that

the

the

deed

only

was

to

reason

the

facilitate

The value of the lot at the time the

Defendant received it from his father was $15,000.00 and at the
time of trial was $35,000.00.
The Plaintiff, in her response, does not refute the case law
cited by the Appellant.

The Court in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760

P. 2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988), held that property acquired by one
spouse through gift or inheritance during the marriage should be
awarded
value.

to that spouse together with any appreciation of
The only

exception relates to when the other

its

spouse

contributes to the enhancement of the property or the property
has lost its identity through commingling or exchange.
14

In this case, the lot was given to the Defendant by his
father as a gift.

The Plaintiff's testimony that she thought the

property was given to her also is without any foundation.

The

Plaintiff

the

had

not been told by

either the Defendant

or

Defendant's father that the gift of the property was to include
her.

On the other hand, the Defendant testified that his father

gifted the property to him on only put the Plaintiff's name on
the deed to facilitate financing.

The Plaintiff did not enhance

the value of the lot by her efforts and the identity of the
property was not lost through commingling or exchange.
Accordingly,

the value of the one-acre parcel

should be

awarded to the Defendant based upon the clear evidence in the
case.
CONCLUSION
Although there is some evidence to support the Plaintiff's
expenses and income as found by the trial court, there is no
evidence to support the trial court's findings as it relates to
the

Defendant's

income

earnings of the parties

and

ability

to pay.

as established

The

historical

by their tax returns

demonstrates that the Plaintiff's income has far exceeded that of
the Defendant.

Accordingly, the order requiring the Defendant to

pay alimony should be set aside.
The trial court's finding that the Defendant should pay an
additional

$350.00

in

alimony

to

offset

the

Plaintiff's

voluntary contribution to an adult child is violative of child
support guidelines and totally inappropriate.
15

The Findings of Fact that relate to the $100,000.00 life
insurance policy should be amended to include the trial court's
instruction that the value of the policy should not exceed the
present value of the Plaintiff's alimony award.

Inasmuch as the

findings justifying the award of alimony are insufficient, the
provision relating to life insurance should likewise be stricken.
Lastly, the court errored in failing to award the value of
the one-acre parcel to the Defendant as a gift from his father.
DATED this

l

°

day of January, 1995.

Michael J. Petro, Esq.
Attorney for Appellant
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I certify that

cT*

copies of the Appellant's Reply Brief

were mailed, postage prepaid to Mr, Brian C, Harrison, Attorney
at Law, 3319 North University Avenue, Suite 200, Provo, Utah
84604 on the

' ^

day of January, 1995.
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